Summary: The relationship between the EU and the Islamic Republic of  US aid to Pakistan has been irregular, with periods of high disbursement of .. The EU's role in Spanish development and democratic consolidation was essential. The United States and Spain have extensive cultural ties and a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and the two countries cooperate. U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS. The United States established diplomatic relations with Spain in Spain severed diplomatic relations with the.
Granting the status of ambassador to the head of the office adds to the institutionalisation of the presence of the EU in Pakistan and bears witness to the intention of establishing a long-term relationship. The second summit was held in June in Brussels.
European Union, Trade in goods with Pakistan. Summits have since then been followed by Strategic Dialogue meetings. The first was held in Islamabad in Aprilwhile the latest took place in Brussels in March Therefore the trade surplus with the EU enjoyed by Pakistan since is expected to increase in the following years. The price some partners have to pay for their alliances differs.
Pakistan–Spain relations | Revolvy
This is especially true of Pakistan. Its different governments have lost legitimacy and popularity because of their relationship with the US. Elected politicians do not have the same powers as military leaders. They also lack the coercive power of the military. Democratic institutions have been severely damaged after almost 40 years of interference from military rule. The army has developed an economic emporium which makes it an elite in its own right, besides devoting much of the national budget to defence and controlling foreign and defence policies.
What role the EU has in mind for the military is something that needs to be debated. It is obvious that they are necessary for Pakistan to become more secure and prosperous, but also that they should be part of the solution, not the problem.
Summits are a means used by the EU to deal with its partners and have become an essential tool for decision-making. They helped legitimise Pakistani leaders in the eyes of their population. It was essential for them to achieve a new political alliance, given the troubled relations with the US. But misunderstandings can arise, too, from the different visions held by Europeans and Pakistanis about the nature of the meetings and suitable interlocutors.
An example occurred at the second summit. The signature of the 18th Amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan 19 April devolved power from the President to the Prime Minister. It was an effort, too, to reinforce democratic institutions in Pakistan.
At last, the summit was finally held on 4 June, instead of 21 April as originally scheduled, and acknowledged the new system by welcoming the Prime Minister as the highest political authority. Another problem with the EU is that it is not regarded as a serious political and security actor.
In that field, the institutional framework and the policy conditionality of the Union prevents it from being perceived as a strong power. The focus that the EU has placed on trade and democracy, and the fact that it is virtually absent in the field of security and military support except for counter-terrorism and police training programmeslimits its potential influence on Pakistan.
Some consider that the aid and development approach is a mistaken and out-dated policy. It not only limits how it is perceived by the military, but also by political parties. The question that arises is what strategy to follow in case a military government should return to power.
The problem lies with what the civilian government can achieve on its own if it wants to achieve it and what the military consent to. The EU can instead provide its own experience with some of its member states. The prevalent role of the military in the dictatorship in Spain changed after the death of Francisco Franco in Pakistanis consider that claims about democracy and human rights are only excuses for foreign powers to apply neo-colonialist policies.
Although this may be reflected in the policies of some individual member states, it might be the EU itself that pays the price.
strategic and international studies
This lack of trust can only be addressed through a dialogue between equals. Europe can bear witness to the success regardless of the current crisis achieved by the acceptance of difference in its framework of common values. Pakistan needs to address its own issues with its provinces, find a path to integrate different visions of Pakistan and undertake a serious policy review. One of the main concerns for the European allies is the plight of minorities in Pakistan and the duplicity with which Islamabad deals with leaders and members of different terrorist groups.
The challenge for Europe is to achieve a comprehensible and credible policy towards Pakistan. The EU needs to be regarded as more than just a trade partner. Policy and defence remain weak areas of its foreign policy with Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan needs to understand that respect for human rights is not an empty demand on paper, but one that has to be matched with real policies.
Europe acknowledges the sacrifices made by Pakistan after Nonetheless, Pakistan must admit its own policy mistakes. A recent declaration by the European Parliament 9 February issued a warning about European funds being channelled, deliberately or through neglect, to terrorists groups. In this regard, the European Parliament demands from the Union a more coherent approach, avoiding double standards and acting consistently if it wants to be regarded as a reliable ally. Warnings should thus be taken seriously.
The EU is also taking a firm stand on Pakistan after it lifted the moratorium on the death penalty. Sincethere have been at least 55 executions.
The Government of Pakistan stated that it would only execute those convicted of terrorism. Nonetheless, it is also using the Anti-Terrorism Law for other convicts.
It would also be breaking its own law, as it currently intends to execute a man who was convicted when he was 14 years old. Pakistan could take advantage of a partner that has expressly manifested its intentions of establishing a long-term relationship, and that has not cut aid, regardless of the many political crises.
The rounds of talks, summits and visits should pave the way for achieving a consensus on the process and agreeing which reforms should be undertaken. This should not mean that there are no limits. Relations are likely to continue to rock along as they have ever since Pakistan and the US became allies in Pakistan, US, terrorism, military aid, economic aid, intelligence cooperation, bin Laden. Mutual distrust has reached a new high. Pakistan has sent US military trainers home, terminated joint counter-insurgency operations, restricted intelligence cooperation and demanded an end to Predator drone attacks.
The relationship may indeed be like a bad marriage, but it is like a marriage in a country where divorce is not possible. Despite the current crisis, Washington and Islamabad are likely to find a way to stumble along. Pakistan desperately needs US economic and military aid to stave off a collapse of its sagging economy and to bolster its army, engaged in a harsh struggle against a fierce Pakistani Taliban insurgency. Success in Afghanistan also depends on getting Pakistan to shut down the havens supporting the Taliban insurgency.
Yet, like any bad marriage, serious differences do exist. But agreement stops there. The fact that these groups directly undercut US interests in a stable Afghanistan and are killing and wounding American soldiers has not deterred Pakistan from providing covert support while denying it is doing so.
A Half-Century Roller Coaster Ride Although the stakes today are vastly higher, the current crisis fits into a well-established pattern.
Ever since the US and Pakistan became allies 57 years ago, their relationship has been extraordinarily volatile, a veritable ride on a roller coaster. While Pakistan was anti-communist, India was its main security concern. The relationship prospered during the Eisenhower Presidency, but faltered over this disconnection during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
Inafter Pakistan went to war with India over Kashmir, Johnson cut off both military and economic aid. For all practical purposes, the alliance was dead. Four years later, Richard Nixon became President and the relationship revived. Under Jimmy Carter, nuclear nonproliferation, democracy and human rights became central planks of US foreign policy. Relations with Pakistan soured on all three counts.
They hit rock bottom on 21 November after an angry mob sacked the US embassy in Islamabad. Four embassy employees died and another trapped in the security vault were minutes from asphyxiation when the mob fortunately dispersed of its own accord.
The Pakistani police and army responded languidly, arriving on the scene only after the attackers had gone. With Ronald Reagan in the White House during the s, relations prospered. A year later, US intelligence agencies firmly concluded that Pakistan possessed a nuclear device.
A reluctant George H. Bush felt compelled to impose Pressler amendment sanctions, suspending military and economic aid. As the new millennium began, Pakistanis remained bitter over US sanctions. Once again, geography made Pakistan a pivotal player for US operations in Afghanistan.
President Pervez Musharraf quickly decided to align his country with the Americans and to abandon the Taliban. In the bargain the two countries reached, Islamabad agreed to: Limited US use of base facilities in Pakistan.
Smooth transit across Pakistan for supplies destined for US forces in Afghanistan.
Over-flight rights for US military aircraft. In turn, the Americans agreed to: Provide substantial security and economic assistance as well as debt relief. Urge international financial institutions and US allies to open their wallets to help Pakistan. Reimburse Islamabad for expenses incurred in supporting the struggle against terror.
At the same time, Pakistan did not go after the Taliban leadership that had resettled around Quetta nor did Bush press Musharraf to arrest Mullah Omar and his top lieutenants. Badly discredited by their harsh rule, the Taliban chiefs seemed relatively harmless in exile in Pakistan.
The Bush-Musharraf bargain served both countries. The economy, in shambles after mismanagement by civilian governments during the s, received a needed shot in the arm.
Yet, many in Islamabad had mixed feelings. Pakistanis deeply resented the and cut-offs of military and economic aid. They viewed the Americans as fickle and fair-weather friends who would probably again dump Pakistan when they no longer needed its help.
The man in the street in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, influenced by the pro-Islamist chorus in the media, took an even bleaker view. Critics believed the relationship too narrowly based on personal ties between Bush and Musharraf.